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-Introduction
The NASDAQ composite index escalated from 2,000 points in the beginning of 1999 to 5,048 points in March 2000, returning to near the 2,000 points after 2000. A similar trend did not occur is other stocks exchange. For instance, along 1999 and 2000 the New York Stock Exchange Composite index (NYSE) varied between 6,092 and 7,164 (Graph 1 shows the evolution of NASDAQ and NYSE composite indices). The unusual rise and fall in the prices of technology stocks has led many academics and practitioners to describe such event as a stock price bubble. 1 Some studies conjecture that high expectations about growth rates caused the high valuations of technology stocks. Schwartz and Moon (2000) observe that high valuation could follow from revenue growth that is both sufficiently high and sufficiently volatile. They calibrate their model to match the valuation of Amazon.com, but they report that the implied return volatility is too high and that the implied revenue distribution is unrealistic. Ofek and Richardson (2002) argue that the earnings of Internet firms would have to grow at implausibly high rates to justify the Internet stock prices of the late 1990s. Pastor and Veronesi (2006) show that a firm's fundamental value increases with uncertainty about average future profitability. Thus, high valuation could come for a combination of high growth and high volatility. By calibrating a stock valuation model, they find that the implied volatility matches the high volatility of NASDAQ stock prices. 2 If one wants to stick to the idea that the high valuation was consequence of high growth, one needs to explain the source of expectations and volatility on growth rates. Table 4 shows that weekly returns on NASDAQ and NYSE indices. The returns on NASDAQ are much more volatile than on NYSE. Weekly returns on NASDAQ changed from 0.1 percent mean and 0.33 1 See, for example, Thaler (1999) , Shiller (2000) , Ofek and Richardson (2002, 2003) , Ritter and Welch (2002) , Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) , Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) , Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) . 2 There were some other attempts to provide rational explanations for the high valuations of technology stocks in the late 1990s. Ofek and Richardson (2003) argue that valuations were high due in part to short-sale constraints. Cochrane (2003) argues that technology stocks were valued highly because they offered high convenience yields. However, neither study demonstrates that the magnitudes of these effects could be sufficiently large to justify the observed valuations of NASDAQ firms. percent standard deviation in 1997-1998 to 0.37 percent mean and 9.25 percent standard deviation. If expectations on growth rate was causing such volatility, there should have been a continuous flow of new information on growth rates. However, data on actual sales growth for public firms are not continuous. They come quarterly and often coincide in time across firms. Therefore, information on growth could not come from balance sheets. We conjecture that the IPOs market provided the necessary continuous flow of information on growth rates.
The birth of the Internet spurred a variety of new products and processes (the so-called New Economy). The Internet also changed the structure of many traditional businesses. For example, it allowed for improved inventory management and new manners of marketing products, stimulating market consolidation in some traditional industries. It even allowed some local businesses to become global (e.g., Amazon.com). Such wave of innovation even raised doubt on whether these new businesses would subsume traditional ones. Thus, the growth rate of New Economy firms was informative for a wide range of businesses. New Economy firms going public presented abnormal realized growth rate, but their tracking record was short because they were young. Short tracking record along with uncertainty about the effectiveness the new processes made difficult the assessment of long-term growth rates (Schwert 2002; Schultz and Zaman, 2001) . We conjecture that IPO market, through the growth rate implied in their underpricing provided a continuous flow of information on growth rates. 3 The stock of public New Economy firms was small and the flow of IPOs was large. Thus, the IPO market was relevant to assess the long-term growth rate of the stock of firms and, consequently, of a wide variety of industries. The continuous flow of highly underpriced/high-growth IPOs lead investors to update upwards their estimated long-term growth rate, causing upward price revision for the whole industry. Furthermore, not all IPOs were highly underpriced. During the bubble the lowest underpricing was -26%. The variance in underpricing could have been the source of volatility.
Necessary to say, by conjecturing that the IPO market was informative we do not deny that other sources of information such as earnings announcements played a role in explaining returns and volatility.
We present evidence supporting our conjecture. We show that during the bubble the flow of IPOs of highly underpriced IPOs (high-implied growth rate) explains returns on the NASDAQ composite index. This result remains even if we replace actual underprice for others different instruments for underpricing that are based on predetermined variables and not correlated to market returns. We also do placebo tests assess the relation between underpricing and NASDAQ returns over other periods besides the bubble.
This article is also related to the theoretical literature on asset bubbles, e.g., Tirole (1985) , Allen and Gorton (1993) , Santos and Woodford (1997) This article is structured as follows: Section 2 presents our model. Section 3 describes variables, data and econometric models. Section 4 presents our results. Section 5 concludes.
-Model
We conjecture that the large inflow of high-growth IPOs influenced the expectation about the growth rate of whole New Economy feeding the price spiral. We motivate this conjecture with the following simple model:
Suppose that a new technology could induce high growth, gH, or low growth rates, gL (gH > gL).
Investors a priori do not know the actual growth rate. The ex-ante probability of high-growth is given by   (0,1). As in Benveniste and Spindt (1989) we assume that during the book-building, institutional investors provide information about the firm that becomes public and common knowledge after the IPO. In particular, we assume that the information gathering process generates a signal about the quality of the technology. Signals can be good (G) or bad (B) . If the growth rate is gH, the probability of a good signal is . If the technology is low growth, the probability of a good signal is ( > ). After every IPO, the growth rate for all the firms using the same technology is updated using Bayes' rule:
To keep argument simple, let us assume that stocks are valued using the Gordon's Constant Growth Model. Let be the cost of capital and assume that agents are risk-neutral.
Then, after each successful IPO, the expected value of the share is given by:
Before the signal was issued, the expected share value was given by:
Consequently, the expected change in price after a good signal is revealed is given by:
where the first term indicates the shift in probability from low to high growth and the second term indicates the net gain in valuation by moving towards a high-growth stock. If the signals are not perfectly correlated, the market valuation of all firms using that technology increases with the number of positive signals. Moreover, the higher the difference between and , the bigger the appreciation following a good signal.
3 -Variables, data and econometric models 3.1 -Variables 
where is a vector of issue's characteristics: VC-sponsorship, Big-four auditing, sales growth, technology industry, age, firm size, offer size, offer-to-firm size, the size of the price interval scaled by its middle point and past M&A activities; and and are estimated coefficients from the regression
= + +
Applied on the sample of IPOs from the pre-bubble period (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) ;
Mean residual underpricing 1: individual residual underpricing is the estimated error term of an underpricing regression on several measures of recent market performance. In particular, our measure controls for the fluctuations in the stock market in the IPO period and past performance,
i.e., we estimate the expected underpricing by the following econometric model:
where the lags in the variation of the NASDAQ and NYSE indexes include the periods of 1,2, and 3 weeks, 1 to 6 months, and 1 year. Therefore, our measure is given by:
Mean residual underpricing 2: Residual underpricing 1 takes into account market and business cycle variations but ignores individual IPO characteristics that may affect underpricing. Residual underpricing 2 also control for IPOs characteristics. We estimate the expected underpricing with the econometric model:
Where , , and are estimated coefficients from the regression using the whole sample period (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) . 
-Data and sample
Our dataset combines data from several sources. From Securities Data Corporation (SDC-Platinum) we obtained an exhaustive list of IPOs and information on offer price, offer date, proceeds, leading underwriter, price interval, issuer age and seasoned equity offerings (SEO). We complemented and corrected SDC-Platinum database following suggestions in Jay Ritter's website (Ritter, 2014) . From Compustat we obtained data on quarterly and annual fundamentals: sales, book value of assets, and Big-Four auditing. Information on VC-sponsoring comes from Venture Economics database. Analysts' coverage comes from the I/B/E/S database.
Data on institutional ownership and its Herfindahl index comes from Thomson Reuters
Institutional Holdings (13F). As measure of underwriter quality we use the Carter and Manaster index (1990) updated by Loughran and Ritter (2004) . Information on bid-ask spreads, delisting due to bankruptcy, mergers and drops, and daily quotation for NYSE and NASDAQ composite indices come from the CRSP-US. We use Loughran and Ritter's (2004) classification to identify High-tech firms. We define three periods: Pre-bubble (1991 Pre-bubble ( -1996 , Transition (1997 and 1998) and Bubble (1999 and 2000) .
Our sample consists of firms completing an IPO between January 1991 and December 2000. As usual, we exclude offerings from closed-end funds, limited partnerships, financial institutions (SIC codes 6000-6999), utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999), real-estate investment trusts, unit offerings, IPOs with offer price below five dollars, and American depositary receipts (ADRs). Our final sample consists of 2,754 IPOs with complete information on all variables used in underpricing regressions. Table 2 describes the drop in sample size due to missing values in relevant variables. Table 3 Panel A compares our sample to that of Ritter (2014). Across periods, our sample is smaller than Ritter (2004) . Overall, our sample comprises 62 percent of his sample. This could be due to our need to for micro data such as sales growth that rules out IPOs of firms without sales records. During the pre-bubble and transition periods, our coverage is 58 and 61 percent of his sample. During the bubble period, the coverage increases to 70 percent. Samples are similar across periods in terms of underpricing, proportion of IPOs at NASDAQ, VC-sponsorship, median age, and proportion of IPOs with price revision up (down) in an annual basis.
Differences are large for gross proceeds (mainly during the bubble). During the pre-bubble period, our sample has a higher proportion of technology firms, but during the transition and bubble periods, that proportion is significantly lower (mainly because our data tends to exclude start-ups). Table 3 Table 4 presents basics statistics on our macroeconomic variable. To keep the discussion simple we compare only the Bubble-restricted period to the Pre-bubble. Returns were significantly higher at NASDAQ during the bubble: 2.17 versus 0.1 percent. Returns were also higher at NYSE but difference was moderate: 0.45 versus 0.07 percent. Volatility (standard deviation) was also much higher at NASDAQ (8.95 versus 0.33 percent) than in NYSE (3.62 versus 0.20 percent). These values imply that the coefficient of variation increased from 3.3 to 4.1 at NASDAQ and from 2.9 to 8.5 at NYSE. Thus, volatility increased in both markets.
Weighted mean sales growth for IPO firms jumped from 3.33 to 6.63 percent. Mean actual underpricing increased from 12.2 to 25.72 percent (this value during the bubble are much lower than the unweighted average that was above 60 percent). Mean predicted underpricing during the bubble is significantly lower than the actual because the parameters used to construct this variable reflects the pre-bubble period. Finally mean residual underpricing 1 significantly higher than mean residual underpricing 2 because in the first case the residual are liquid of market variations while in the second, of market variations and individual IPOs characteristics. Table 5 presents correlations among macroeconomic variables across the four periods that we defined. One can see that statistical significance does not depend on the period. The most relevant information is that all the proxies for expected growth are positively correlated and usually statistical significant at the one percent level. The only exception is the correlation between Mean predicted underpricing and Mean residual 1 which is not statistically significant.
Returns on NASDAQ and NYSE are positively correlated and statistically at the one percent level in all periods, such correlation is significantly lower during the bubble period. Mean predicted underpricing is the only other variable to which Returns on NASDAQ correlates. This correlation is stronger during the pre-bubble period, but this was expected since the pre-bubble sample was used to obtain the coefficients used to calculate predicted underpricing. The number of IPOs is positively correlated to mean sales growth and mean predicted underpricing. It is important to notice that the correlations between the Mean residual underpricing 1 and 2 with the market indices are virtually null, indicating that the procedure we used in fact eliminated reverse causality issues. Similarly, the correlation between market indices and mean sales growth is virtually null, showing that reverse causality is not an issue for sales growth as proxy for expected growth.
-Econometric models
We claim that, during the bubble, returns on the NASDAQ composite index responded to the underpricing of IPOs. To measure this correlation one must control for high-frequency macroeconomic shocks. Fortunately, the bubble was mostly restricted to NASDAQ, both in terms of price spiral and IPO flow, barely affecting the New York Stock Exchange index (NYSE). 4 Thus, we use the NYSE index returns to control for high-frequency macroeconomic shocks. We also control for the activity in the IPO market, both in terms of the number of IPOs in period t, as well as the average underpricing.
Moreover, we control for proxies of the presence of high growth opportunities through measures of high underpricing and high growth. In particular our econometric models are
where ∆ is the percent change in the market index in period ;
# is the number of IPOs in period ; and : several proxies for expected growth in period t (Mean actual underpricing, Mean predicted underpricing, Mean sales growth, Mean residual underpricing 1 and Mean residual underpricing 2.
We estimate Model 1 using both weekly returns and three-week rolling returns.
Estimations come from least squares regressions with Newey-West (12 lags) standard errors (Newey and West, 1987). Over the Bubble restricted period, all the proxies for expected growth turn out to be statistically significant.
-Results
As Regressions 2B and 4B are on weekly returns, there is an economic interpretation for the coefficients on the mean of actual underpricing. For instance, in Regression 2B the coefficient is 0.003 and the weekly mean underpricing is 25.72% (from Table 4 percent. Thus, the effect of the actual underpricing is sizable.
As expected, over the Bubble extended period (1999) (2000) , the statistical significance of the explanatory variables tend to be smaller. This was expected: along 2000 there was the burst of the bubble and its last months were not bubble period. Actual underpricing and sales growth remain statistically significant in all circumstances. Predicted underpricing, only for three-week periods (Regression 3C). Residual underpricing 1 and 2 lose statistical significance.
To remind the reader, we argument that during the bubble the IPO market was relevant to assess the long-term growth rate of the New Economy (and other industries), because the stock of public firms in the sector was small and the flow of IPOs was large. This is not true for the pre-bubble and transition periods. Thus, we expect that implied growth rates coming from the IPO market do not affect market valuation out of the bubble.
Panel B presents placebo tests, in which we evaluate the behavior of our proxies for growth out of the bubble. The overall picture is that actual mean underpricing (Regression 5B to 8B) and predicted mean underpricing (5C to 8C) are still statistically significant to explain stock market fluctuations in the pre-bubble and transition periods. Sales Growth and Residual underpricing 1 and Residual underpricing 2 are not statistically significant. In fact, for these three variables coefficients are small in magnitude and statistical significance.
In Regressions 5B to 8B and 5C to 8C, both the actual mean underpricing and predicted mean underpricing are still correlated with stock market fluctuations in the pre-bubble and transition periods. One possible issue is that booms and busts in the stock market contaminate these proxies for growth opportunities, for example. Differently, sales growth and our constructed measures of residual mean underpricing are uncorrelated with market movements in the pre-bubble period. The effect of the actual and predicted underpricing was already expected.
As augmented before the booms and busts of the stock market as a whole can contaminate the actual underpricing of individual IPOs. Predicted underpricing were estimated using IPOs individual characteristics and the pre-bubble period as basis to obtain parameters. This procedure does not control for market timing in which certain firms choose to go public in hot markets. On the other hand, the clean result obtained for the variables that are not contaminated by contemporaneous market returns strongly suggest that implied growth rates coming from the IPO market do not affect overall market valuation.
-Conclusion
We conjecture that the Internet bubble and the concomitant high underpricing was consequence of the emergence of the Dotcom industry and the introduction of disruptive, high growth technologies. We show that, during the bubble, proxies for high-expected growth explain returns on the NASDAQ composite index. In our empirical strategy, we proxy for expected growth using both actual and predicted mean underpricing, sales growth, and constructed measures of mean underpricing that attempt to net underpricing from boom and bust movements of the overall stock market. We also control for macroeconomic low-frequency shocks through the variation in NYSE composite index. Moreover, we show that growth proxies that are not contaminated by the booms and busts of the stock market as a whole are uncorrelated with the Underpricing: first trading day closing price relative to the offer price; Age: IPO year minus founding year; Firm size: book value of assets in the last financial report before the IPO; Technology: dummy variable indicating technology industries as defined in Loughran and Ritter (2004) ; Sales growth: geometric average of quarterly sales growth during the last three quarters before the IPO (or available period, if less); High-growth: dummy variable indicating quarterly sales growth above 100%; Offer size: filled amount in the IPO prospectus; and Top underwriting: dummy variable indicating that the Carter-Manaster index for the member of the underwriting syndicate with the highest score is bigger than 8. Number of firms with the attribute and t-statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and *** to denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1percent levels (in boldface). The number or observations is 2,754.
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Least squares estimations using Newey-West (12 lags) standard errors for the models ∆ = + ∆ + # _ + # _ ℎ + and ∆ = + ∆ + # + ( _ ℎ) + , where ∆ is the percent change in the index over period ; NASDAQ is the NASDAQ composite index and NYSE is the NYSE composite index. # is the number of IPOs in period . # _ is the number of IPOs with low underpricing (or sales growth) in period . # _ ℎ is the number of IPOs with high sales growth in period . Sample consists of 107 weeks from Jan/1999 to Dec/2000 (633 IPOs in this sample period). T-statistics are in parentheses. We use *, ** and *** to denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels (two sided).
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